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1 A Distributed Scheme to Detect
2 Wormhole Attacks in Mobile Wireless
3 Sensor Networks
4 Oya Simsek and Albert Levi
5 Abstract Due to mostly being unattended, sensor nodes become open to physical
6 attacks such as wormhole attack, which is our focus in this paper. Various solu-
7 tions are proposed for wormhole attacks in sensor networks, but only a few of
8 them take mobility of sensor nodes into account. We propose a distributed
9 wormhole detection scheme for mobile wireless sensor networks in which mobility
10 of sensor nodes is utilized to estimate two network features (i.e. network node
11 density, standard deviation in network node density) through using neighboring
12 information in a local manner. Wormhole attack is detected via observing
13 anomalies in the neighbor nodes’ behaviors based on the estimated network fea-
14 tures and the neighboring information. We analyze the performance of proposed
15 scheme via simulations. The results show that our scheme achieves a detection rate
16 up to 100% with very small false positive rate (at most 1.5%) if the system
17 parameters are chosen accordingly. Moreover, our solution requires neither
18 additional hardware nor tight clock synchronization which are both costly for
19 sensor networks.
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23 1 Introduction
24 As a result of significant advances in hardware manufacturing and wireless
25 communication technology along with efficient software algorithms, wireless
26 sensor networks [1] emerged as a promising network infrastructure for various
27 applications. Due to being mostly unattended and the open nature of wireless
28 communication channels, sensor nodes become open to physical attacks which
29 may lead to various attacks including wormhole attack. In wormhole attack,
30 an attacker tunnels messages received in one part of the network over a wormhole
31 link and replays them in a different part of the network. This low-latency tunnel
32 attracts network traffic on the wormhole link which can empower the attacker to
33 perform traffic analysis, denial of service attacks; collect data to compromise
34 cryptographic material; or just selectively drop data packets through controlling
35 these routes using the wormhole link. Moreover, an attacker can perform this
36 attack without compromising any legitimate nodes, or knowing any cryptographic
37 materials since the attacker neither creates new packets nor alters existing packets.
38 There are several approaches for wormhole detection in wireless sensor net-
39 works which mostly focus on static networks. These solutions are mainly based on
40 detecting the maximum distance any message can travel, or the maximum time of
41 travel of any message [2], discovering one-hop neighbors in a secure way [3],
42 or monitoring the data traffic of neighbor nodes [4]. Also, most of these approaches
43 require additional hardware (e.g. directional antennas in [5], GPS in [2], a spe-
44 cialized hardware for one-bit challenge request-response [3] protocol), special
45 trusted nodes such as guards in [6], highly accurate time or location measurements
46 [3], or tight clock synchronization [2], which seems infeasible for large scale
47 wireless sensor networks because of its resource limitations and economic costs.
48 In this paper, we propose a distributed wormhole detection scheme for mobile
49 wireless sensor networks. Our scheme aims to utilize the mobility feature of the
50 sensor nodes to examine the environment and network properties, and derive new
51 features which help understanding the network better.
52 2 Proposed Scheme
53 Our scheme includes two main phases: (1) stabilization, and (2) detection phases.
54 Stabilization phase is for sensor nodes to collect information from the network
55 through using neighboring information to estimate the node density of the network
56 locally, dri ; for node i at rth round, and to compute the standard deviation of the
57 change in the estimated node density, rri : This phase runs once right after
58 the uniform random deployment of the sensor nodes. In detection phase, based on
59 the pre-computed statistical values, the detection mechanism is activated to check
60 for anomalies in the network, and detected nodes are revoked from the network.
61 Without a wormhole attack being performed, the difference between the number of
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62 neighbors of a node and its estimated network density does not exceed the standard
63 deviation of its network density. However, under wormhole attack, this difference
64 can be higher due to fake neighboring connections, especially when a node is close
65 to the wormhole ends.
66 2.1 Network Assumptions and Threat Model
67 The network is composed of mobile nodes having same communication range as
68 well as same physical properties. The sensor nodes are deployed randomly using
69 uniform distribution in the sensing area. None of the nodes know their location
70 information. Nodes can obtain the neighbor count information of their neighbors as
71 well as their own neighboring information. Secure neighbor discovery is out of the
72 scope of the paper. There are proposed solutions for neighbor discovery, [7, 8],
73 addressing node mobility as well as energy efficiency in the literature. Necessary link
74 level security requirements (i.e. confidentiality, authentication, and integrity) are
75 assumed to be fulfilled by the lower layers. It is sufficient for an attacker to capture
76 two legitimate nodes and create a low-latency tunnel between them. We assume that
77 the wormhole link is bidirectional. In other words, both ends of wormhole link
78 overhear the packets; tunnel these packets to other node via this low-latency tunnel
79 so that the receiving node can replay these packets at that end of the wormhole.
80 The attacker may drop the packets selectively in a random way. However, by doing
81 so, the wormhole link becomes less attractive and this is not a desired situation for the
82 attacker. Thus, we assume that the attacker does not drop any packets.
83 2.2 Details of the Proposed Scheme
84 Stabilization Phase. Stabilization phase starts right after the uniform random
85 deployment of N sensor nodes, and runs S rounds. In a round, each node discovers
86 their neighbors securely, broadcasts its neighbor count, and locally computes
87 statistical features of the network (i.e. dri and r
r
i ) after receiving all neighbor
88 counts of its neighbors.
89 Share Neighboring Information. When a node learns its neighbors, it broadcasts
90 an information packet including its own identity, i, and the number of its neigh-
91 bors, Wi. This information is critical while estimating the network features.
92 Calculate and Update Statistical Metrics. After all nodes share the number of
93 their neighbors, each node i has the following information: its own neighbors, Ni,
94 the number of its own neighbor number, Wi, and neighbor count information of its
95 neighbors, Wj; 8j 2 Ni: Then, node i computes the network density, dri ; and stan-
96 dard deviation in dri ; r
r
i ; in a local way using equations (initial conditions are
97 d0i ¼ 0 and r0i ¼ 0):
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98
dri ¼
Wi þ
P
j2Ni Wj
Wi þ 1  ð1  aÞ þ d
r1
i  a ð1Þ
100
101
102
rri ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
Wi þ 1 
X
j2Ni Wj  d
r1
i
 2
  
þ Wi  dr1ið Þ2
h ir
 ð1  aÞ þ ar1i  a ð2Þ
1045 We use exponential averaging, which we are inspired by its usage in TCP round
106 trip time estimation, to give more importance to the latest data retrieved from
107 neighbors without losing the previous calculated values. a and (1 - a) are the
108 weights which are used to estimate standard deviation and local network density of
109 a node. At each round, each node estimates a candidate density value which is
110 calculated by averaging the neighbor counts received from neighbors along with
111 its own neighbor count (Eq. 1). After that, the node updates its density via using
112 the exponential average of the previous value and the new estimated value. The
113 procedure is same for the calculation of standard deviation in the node density
114 (Eq. 2).
115 Detection Phase. In detection phase, pre-computed network features along with
116 round threshold, Tround, (i.e. the maximum number of rounds in which a node
117 a needs to witness an anomaly about a node b to keep node b in its local suspected
118 nodes list), alarm threshold, Talarm, (i.e. the minimum number of alarm to broad-
119 cast a node as globally suspected), and revocation threshold, Trevoc, (i.e. the
120 number of nodes required to revoke a node), are used to detect the anomaly created
121 by the wormhole link. A round in detection phase is composed of neighbor
122 discovery, sharing the number of neighbors, testing detection criteria along with
123 broadcasting specific messages when necessary, and finally revocation of detected
124 nodes.
125 Check for Suspicious Nodes based on Statistical Metrics. After obtaining the
126 neighborhood information, each node i has locally-estimated network density,
127 dsi ; and locally-estimated standard deviation in d
s
i ; r
s
i ; and the neighboring
128 information Wj; 8j 2 Ni: To detect an anomaly, node i first checks whether the
129 number of its own neighbors exceeds dsi more than r
s
i : If the difference exceeds
130 rsi ; it accuses its neighbors and adds them to its list which is for tracking
131 locally suspicious nodes. Otherwise, node i checks its neighbors one by one
132 with the same method to detect a suspicious behavior and updates its list
133 accordingly. If the alarm counter for a locally suspected node j exceeds Talarm,
134 then node i broadcasts a message deeming j is a globally suspected node.
135 If any node in the list of locally suspected nodes does not show an anomaly
136 during Tround, then node i deletes that node from its list. When a node
137 i receives an alarm saying node j is a potential malicious node, it runs the
138 following check: If j is already in its globally suspected nodes list, it updates
139 the alarm counter of j; otherwise, it adds j to the list. To revoke node j, the
140 number of nodes deeming node j as suspected must exceed Trevoc which is
141 basically a preset percentage of the total number of nodes in the network.
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142 Revoke Detected Node. A globally suspected node can be revoked from net-
143 work through node self-destruction mechanisms proposed in [9] and [10]. When a
144 node i receives a message saying node j is a malicious node, it sends a message
145 to the base station for revocation of j and updates its list which is for keeping track
146 of revoked nodes accordingly.
147 3 Performance Evaluation
148 We analyzed the performance of our scheme via simulations, and present our
149 results in a comparative way. We analyzed the effects of the change in the system
150 parameters on the detection rate under the simulation setup defined below. Due to
151 limitation of space, only a small subset of the simulation results is included in the
152 paper.
153 The results presented in the graphs are average of 20 simulations. N = 200
154 nodes are distributed over a field of A = 100 m 9 100 m. We use random
155 movement model in which each node chooses a random direction; and moves
156 towards it with a uniformly distributed random speed in the range of (5, 15 m/s).
157 Nodes have a communication range of 15 m. We simulated various values of
158 Talarm and Trevoc. The results show that the more optimal and stable value for
159 a is 0.5. Therefore, we choose a as 0.5 in our simulations. We assume that 5% of
160 all nodes are static all the time. Also, we assume that wormhole attack is not
161 performed during stabilization phase. Stabilization phase runs once and lasts
162 S = 1,000 rounds. Detection phase runs during the lifetime of a sensor node due to
163 the possibility of wormhole attack being performed at any time. However, we limit
164 this value to 2,000 rounds in our simulations.
165 Detection and false positive rates are our main metrics while evaluating the
166 success of the simulations. Detection rate is the ratio of the number of simulation
167 runs where the wormhole is detected successfully, D#, over total number of
168 simulation runs, S#, which is computed as D#/S#. False positive rate per simula-
169 tion run is computed as the ratio of falsely detected nodes, F#, over total node
170 number, N. False positive rate is the average of this ratio of all simulation runs,
171 hence, it is computed as
PS#
1
F#
Nð Þ
S# :
172 If Talarm increases, node i needs to witness more suspicious behavior of node j to
173 broadcast it as globally suspected, and detection probability of wormhole
174 decreases considering the mobility of the nodes. Since nodes are mobile, they may
175 not be under the effect of wormhole for such long time to exceed that high Talarm
176 value for a suspected node. Hence, there may not be enough nodes to broadcast
177 that suspected node as globally suspected. The number of revoked nodes
178 decreases, thus, detection and false positive rate decreases. Similarly, Trevoc is
179 inversely proportional to the number of revoked nodes since high Trevoc means
180 more nodes are required to agree on revoking a node. The simulation results which
181 are presented in Figs. 1 and 2 verify those observations. Increasing Talarm or Trevoc
A Distributed Scheme to Detect Wormhole Attacks 5
Layout: T1 Standard SC Book ID: 218207_1_En Book ISBN: 978-1-4471-2154-1
Chapter No.: 19 Date: 11-8-2011 Page: 5/7
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
182 decreases the detection and false positive rates, but they do not change much after
183 a high enough Talarm value.
184 4 Conclusions
185 In this paper, we propose a distributed wormhole detection scheme for mobile
186 wireless sensor networks which utilizes mobility of sensor nodes to detect
187 wormhole attack to estimate new features in a local way which helps under-
188 standing the network better. Wormhole attack is detected via observing anomalies
189 in the neighbor nodes’ behaviors based on these estimated network features and
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Fig. 1 Detection rate versus Alarm threshold (Talarm) for Trevoc = 10, Trevoc = 20, and
Trevoc = 30; Tround = 20; wormhole ends are chosen randomly
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Fig. 2 False positive rate versus Alarm threshold (Talarm) for Trevoc = 10, Trevoc = 20, and
Trevoc = 30; Tround = 20; wormhole ends are chosen randomly
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190 the neighboring information. We analyzed the performance of proposed scheme
191 via simulations using different system parameters. The results show that our
192 scheme achieves a detection rate up to 100% with very small false positive rate
193 (at most 1.5%) if the system parameters are chosen accordingly. Moreover, our
194 solution requires neither additional hardware nor tight clock synchronization
195 which are both costly for sensor networks.
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